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SUMMARY 
Innovation is often assumed to be the work of a talented few, whose products are passed on to the 
masses. Here we argue that innovations are instead an emergent property of our species’ cultural 
learning abilities, applied within our societies and social networks. Our societies and social networks 
act as collective brains. We outline how many human brains, which evolved primarily for the 
acquisition of culture, together beget a collective brain. Within these collective brains, the three main 
sources of innovation are serendipity, recombination, and incremental improvement. We argue that 
rates of innovation are heavily influenced by (1) sociality, (2) transmission fidelity and (3) cultural 
variance. We discuss some of the forces that affect these factors. These factors can also shape each 
other. For example, we provide preliminary evidence that transmission efficiency is affected by 
sociality—languages with more speakers are more efficient. We argue that collective brains can make 
each of their constituent cultural brains more innovative. This perspective sheds light on traits, such 
as IQ, that have been implicated in innovation. A collective brain perspective can help us understand 
otherwise puzzling findings in the IQ literature, including group differences, heritability differences, 
and the dramatic increase in IQ test scores over time. 
Keywords: innovation, technology, cultural evolution, social learning, language, intelligence  
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INTRODUCTION 
Sixty thousand years ago, a group of tropical primates left Africa and began exploring the world. By 
around 12,000 years ago, most of the planet’s major ecosystems had been colonized—from lush 
rainforests to frozen tundra to arid deserts. The colonization of these diverse environments was 
achieved largely through culturally-evolved technological and social innovation, rather than through 
local genetic adaptation [although there was some of this too; e.g., 1]. Where did this technology and 
culture come from? How did our ancestors invent tools, discover knowledge, and develop a body of 
beliefs, values, and practices that allowed them to survive in environments so alien to their ancestral 
African homeland? And how can answering these questions inform our understanding of innovation 
through history and in the modern world? 
A folk-historical answer to these questions is that smart people from days gone by invented these 
tools, discovered this knowledge, and prescribed and proscribed obligations and taboos. These 
practices and know-how were then passed down from generation to generation [2, 3]. Fire-making 
know-how, for example, is said to have been given to the Australian Aboriginals by Crow [4], to the 
Indians by Mātariśvan [5], and to the Greeks by Prometheus [6]. Mimi taught Australian Aboriginals 
to hunt and cook kangaroo [7], and more recently Shaka Zulu invented the iklwa short spear [8]. 
These savvy ancestors, who sometimes ascend to divine status, are often invoked to sanction proper 
form, protocols, or practices [9], reinforcing their “inventor” status. Non-WEIRD people [10] and 
members of small-scale societies are not alone in these beliefs. WEIRD children are taught that 
Edison (or Swan) invented the lightbulb, Gutenberg the printing press, Newton “the calculus”, and 
Ford the automobile. The underlying intuition is that innovation is an individual endeavor, driven by 
heroic geniuses and then passed on to the masses. Or as Pinker [11] describes it, innovations (or 
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“complex memes” [11]) arise when “some person knuckles down, racks his brain, musters his 
ingenuity, and composes or writes or paints or invents something” (p. 209). 
We instead argue that innovations, large or small, do not require heroic geniuses any more than your 
thoughts hinge on a particular neuron. Rather, just as thoughts are an emergent property of neurons 
firing in our neural networks, innovations arise as an emergent consequence of our species’ 
psychology applied within our societies and social networks. Our societies and social networks act as 
collective brains. Individuals connected in collective brains, selectively transmitting and learning 
information, often well outside their conscious awareness, can produce complex designs without the 
need for a designer—just as natural selection does in genetic evolution. The processes of cumulative 
cultural evolution result in technologies and techniques that no single individual could recreate in 
their lifetime, and do not require its beneficiaries to understand how and why they work [12; SM for 
further discussion]. Such cultural adaptations appear functionally well designed to meet local 
problems, yet they lack a designer. 
Here, we outline in more detail the origins and machinations of collective brains. We begin by 
discussing the “neurons” of the collective brain, individuals with brains evolved for, and entirely 
dependent on, the acquisition of culture—cultural brains. Our cultural brains evolved in tandem with 
our collective brains, and are rather limited in isolation. Indeed, there are numerous examples of the 
failure of big-brained explorers to survive in new environments without access to cumulative bodies 
of cultural know-how [12]. We summarize the evolution of cultural brains and the resulting 
psychology, and then explain how such individual brains beget collective brains. We sketch how 
cultural brains are linked into collective brains that generate inventions and diffuse innovations, and 
then discuss factors that have influenced innovation rates throughout history and across societies. 
Heuristically, these can be partitioned into: (1) sociality, (2) transmission fidelity, and (3) 
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transmission variance. Each of these factors influences the speed of adaptive cultural evolution and 
the rate of innovation, but they also affect each other. For example, cultural evolution may shape the 
transmission efficiency of languages. Illustrating this possibility, we show how the size of the 
community of speakers relates to the communicative efficiency of a language. These results suggest 
that language may be subject to the same cultural evolutionary processes as other technologies. 
Finally, we examine some of the ways in which collective brains can feedback to make each of their 
constituent cultural brains “smarter”—or at least cognitively better equipped to deal with local 
challenges. And in doing so, we address an understudied aspect of cultural evolution, how culture 
affects culture; that is, how ideas interact to change the innovation landscape, constraining and 
opening new thought spaces. 
THE CULTURAL BRAIN AND THE COLLECTIVE BRAIN 
Why are humans so different to all other animals? Many have suggested that the answer lies in our 
massive brains, which tripled in size in the last few million years [13, 14] and are 3.5  times as large as 
modern chimpanzees’. This increase is puzzling. And more puzzling still, it may be part of a longer-
term trend toward larger, more complex brains in many taxa [14-16]. The source of the puzzle is that 
while both cross-species [17-20] and direct experimental evidence [21] suggest that larger brains are 
associated with greater cognitive ability, brain tissue is energetically and developmentally expensive 
[22]. A species needs to be able to pay for a larger brain. One way to lower the cost is by trading off 
other costly tissue, metabolic rate, and/or changing reproductive investment strategy [23, 24]. 
Another is to increase energy input by ensuring a reliable source of more calories [24]. To pay for 
our larger brains, we gained access to higher calorie foods—which we acquired through a 
combination of better tools and techniques for hunting; better know-how to access high-calorie 
food sources such as tubers, roots, and honey; and better food processing techniques [for a recent 
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review and evidence, see 12]. In particular, processing food by cooking allowed our genus to unlock 
more calories from the same food sources, yet, as many college students can attest, cooking is not a 
reliably developing, genetically-hardwired skill. Our reliance on tools, techniques, and know-how 
that are not hardwired is a clue to solving the puzzle of the large human brain. 
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL BRAINS 
Humans possess cultural brains—brains that evolved primarily for the acquisition of adaptive 
knowledge. A large body of theoretical and empirical evidence under the umbrella of Dual Inheritance 
Theory or Gene-Culture Coevolution now supports this perspective [for a recent review, see 12, 25, 26]. 
This Cultural Brain Hypothesis proposes that the primary selection pressure for large brains across 
many taxa was adaptive knowledge—locally adaptive information plausibly related to solving 
problems such as finding and processing food, avoiding predators, making tools, and locating water. 
The availability of this knowledge and the payoffs associated with it are what constrain the size of 
brains.  
To explore the Cultural Brain Hypothesis, we recently constructed an evolutionary simulation model 
that captures the causal relationships outlined in Figure 1 (under review). Here we present a verbal 
exposition of this model. Brain size/complexity/organization (different measures of brain size are 
typically highly correlated [27]) coevolves with adaptive knowledge; larger, more complex brains can 
store and manage more information and in turn, this information can support the costs of a larger 
brain. This adaptive knowledge could be acquired asocially, such as finding a food source and 
remembering its location, or socially, such as copying a conspecific in a method of food extraction. 
More and better adaptive knowledge supports a larger carrying capacity by allowing more individuals 
to survive. And if those groups have enough adaptive knowledge, social learning might be favored. 
Social learners can acquire more adaptive knowledge at a lower cost, and without having to generate 
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the information, do so with a smaller brain. Larger groups of social learners with more adaptive 
knowledge, create a selection pressure for an extended juvenile period to acquire this knowledge. 
And under some circumstances, this can lead to oblique learning and selective biases to distinguish 
who to learn from—the human pathway to truly cultural brains.  
 
Figure 1. Causal relationships suggested by the Cultural Brain Hypothesis and captured in our simulation. 
Oblique learning and learning biases refer to the ability to select non-genetic parents with more adaptive 
knowledge from whom to socially learn. 
Our simulation points to the existence of at least 2 regimes: species that rely more on asocial 
learning and species that rely more on social learning. In both regimes, the theory predicts a 
relationship between brain size and adaptive knowledge. For primarily asocial learners, the theory 
predicts a weaker (or non-existent) relationship between brain size/cognitive capacity and group 
size, since group size is only increased by increased carrying capacity through the benefits of 
adaptive knowledge. In contrast, for taxa with some amount of social learning, the theory predicts a 
strong relationship between brain size and group size (and other measures of sociality), since group 
size also provides access to more adaptive knowledge. In these taxa more reliant on social learning, 
the theory also predicts positive intercorrelations between the other variables in Figure 1. 
The pattern revealed in our simulation are consistent with several lines of empirical evidence and 
also make further predictions that have yet to be tested. The theory is consistent with positive 
correlations between:  
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(1) Brain size and general cognitive ability [19, 20, 28]. Greater cognitive ability implies an 
increased ability to store, manage, integrate, and utilize more knowledge.  
(2) Brain size and group size or other measures of sociality—the basis for the Social Brain 
Hypothesis [29]. Such relationships are a byproduct of brains evolving to acquire adaptive 
knowledge, and are predicted to be strongest among taxa with more social learning, since 
larger groups possess more adaptive knowledge for social learners to exploit. 
(3) Brain size and social learning [18, 30]. More social learning evolves in the presence of more 
adaptive knowledge, allowing for larger brains.  
(4) Brain size and the length of the juvenile period [31].  The juvenile period extends when 
social learners require more time to acquire a larger body of adaptive knowledge. 
(5) Group size and the length of the juvenile period [32]. A byproduct of larger groups 
possessing more adaptive knowledge, which resulted in an extended juvenile period. 
(6) Group size and number of cultural traits [33, 34]. Larger groups of social learners possess 
more adaptive knowledge. This relationship is expected to be strongest in the realm of 
cumulative cultural evolution [35-39]—humans. 
These variables are interrelated, because they are a byproduct of brains evolving to acquire, store, 
and manage adaptive knowledge. The specific evolutionary pathway taken by different species is 
influenced by ecological and phylogenetic constraints related to the richness of the ecology (which 
affects payoffs for adaptive knowledge), mating structure and reproductive skew, the effectiveness 
of individual learning, and transmission fidelity. In our simulation, a narrow set of conditions lead to 
cumulative culture, a third regime of heavy reliance on social learning unique to humans. These 
conditions can be considered a Cumulative Cultural Brain Hypothesis. 
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The Cumulative Cultural Brain Hypothesis posits that the same processes that led to widespread 
social learning can, under some conditions, lead to an autocatalytic take off in brain 
size/complexity—the human pathway. Some of the conditions and prerequisites for this takeoff are 
as follows: 
(1) High transmission fidelity. As with other models [e.g., 40, 41], our simulation suggests 
that high transmission fidelity is crucial for cumulative cultural evolution. Transmission 
fidelity is affected by many factors, including task difficulty (easier tasks are more easily 
transmitted); cognitive abilities, such as an ability to simulate other minds [Theory of Mind; 
42]; proclivities, such as overimitation [43, 44]; social factors such as tolerance and pro-
sociality  [45, 46]; and culturally evolved innovations, such as teaching [47, 48].  
(2) Smart ancestors. Entering this regime of genetic evolution driven by cumulative cultural 
evolution is more likely when the process begins with ancestors who are good at individual 
learning. These asocial learners developed a body of knowledge worth exploiting through 
social learning. Since not all individuals possess equally adaptive knowledge in a single 
generation, this can lead to oblique learning to learn from non-parents and learning biases to 
select the individual with the most adaptive knowledge. And of course having access to more 
potential models leads to a higher probability of acquiring higher quality knowledge. For 
further discussion, see SM. 
(3) Sociality. Our model corroborates previous models in revealing a causal relationship 
between sociality and cultural complexity. This relationship is now supported by several 
independent experiments and convergent field evidence [reviewed in 12, 35]. Larger and 
more interconnected populations generate more, and more rapid, cumulative cultural 
evolution. 
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(4) Mating structure, low reproductive skew. Our model suggest that that low reproductive 
skew, consistent with “monogamish” mating structures, are more likely to lead to social 
learning and therefore to cumulative cultural evolution. Several researchers have posited the 
existence of ancient cooperative breeding human societies [reviewed in 49] and pair-bonding 
[12, 50], with evidence of both in among modern hunter-gatherers [51].  
This approach proposes that human brains have evolved with an ability and proclivity for selective, 
high fidelity social learning. In a world of imperfect cues for the adaptive value of culture, there are a 
variety of strategies and biases that have evolved to hone in on the most adaptive knowledge. These 
strategies and biases include direct and indirect cues of the popularity of cultural traits [e.g., 
conformist transmission bias; 52], direct and indirect cues that a potential model has adaptive know-
how worth learning [e.g., success and prestige biases; 35, 53], filtering mechanisms to assess the 
accuracy of information and sincerity of models [e.g., Credibility Enhancing Displays (CREDs); 54], 
personal relevance of culture [55], and biases toward certain content (e.g., dangerous animals [56], 
the edibility of plants [57], fire [58], and gossip [59]). For further discussion and reviews see [25]. 
These learning strategies selectively network many cultural brains into larger collective brains. 
NETWORKING CULTURAL BRAINS INTO COLLECTIVE BRAINS 
Underlying the many social structures of the collective brain is a psychology that supports both 
social norms and ethnic identification. Norms are the shared behavioral standards of a group and 
humans have evolved a suite of norm-psychology to infer and remember what these norms are; when, 
where, and to whom they apply (e.g., a norm governing women’s use of menstrual huts); as well as 
how they are enforced; and the consequences and reparations for violations [46]. To understand to 
whom norms apply, we need to be able to identify group membership. Our species has an evolved 
ethnic-psychology to recognize and identify ingroups and outgroups—often overlapping (e.g., Spanish 
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and Catholic) or embedded (e.g., American and New Yorker)—to which individuals belong and 
whom particular sets of norms may apply. Our ethnic psychology may have evolved from an earlier 
kin identification psychology, but in humans, ethnicities are often delineated by arbitrary markers 
allowing individuals to preferentially interact with those who share their norms [60]. In the presence 
of inter-group competition, our ethnic psychology can lead to ingroup favoritism [61]. Our ethnic-
psychology and norm-psychology together tell us what groups we belong to and the expected 
behavior within those groups.  
Once norm-psychology and ethnic-psychology evolved, the processes of cultural evolution could 
select for adaptive norms that support institutions and other social structures that solve adaptive 
problems. Marriage is a good example [for more discussion on marriage and other institutions, see 
12: Chapter 9]. Marriage norms, in addition to alleviating problems of paternal uncertainty (by 
reducing infidelity), can bind larger groups of people in affinal (in-law) relationships with 
corresponding norms governing expectations and responsibilities [12: Chapter 9, 62]. Thus, from 
norms concerning marriage and family, cultural evolution can create norms concerning extended kin 
and kinship, leading to communities and other social structures of the collective brain. 
The most basic structure of the collective brain is the family. Young cultural learners first gain access 
to their parents, and possibly a range of alloparents (aunts, grandfathers, etc.). Families are 
embedded in larger groups, which may take many forms, from egalitarian hunter-gatherers to 
villages, clans, and Big Man societies, from chiefdoms to states with different degrees of democracy, 
free-markets, and welfare systems, to large unions like the United States and European Union [for a 
discussion of the evolution of human societies, see 63, 64]. Social norms governing kinship can 
affect the degree to which these smaller groups integrate into larger groups. For example, more 
outgroup marriage (exogamy) can bind former clans into networks of related clans, traditionally 
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called a tribe or ethnolinguistic group. Other cultural groupings include friendships and cliques,  
religious groups, formal institutions, castes, guilds and occupational specialization. These groupings 
have corresponding norms and specialized knowledge, and individuals may belong to multiple 
groups. Over time, the norms and regulations within these groups and institutions can be formally 
documented through legal codes and constitutions, creating more persistent, “hardened” norms. 
Thus, like the neural networks of the biological brain, the social networks of the collective brain 
have underlying structures. 
Collective brains differ in many ways: size, interconnectivity, network properties, social groupings, 
and so on. And, as cross-cultural research reveals, collective brains also differ in the psychology of 
their constituent cultural brains. For example, some societies have a higher level of xenophobia [65] 
with potential implications for the inflow of ideas from outgroups. Societies also differ in 
“tightness” and “looseness” [66]—their openness to divergent ideas—with consequent effects for 
cultural variance [67]. In the next section, we discuss how innovations arise and diffuse, as well as 
the factors that affect the rate of innovation. We then discuss how these same factors change the 
cultural brain. 
INNOVATION IN THE COLLECTIVE BRAIN 
There are many potential sources of new ideas and practices in the collective brain and selective, 
high fidelity social learning ensures that these innovations are transmitted both horizontally 
throughout the population and vertically/obliquely from generation to generation. In human 
populations, culture has accumulated over generations to the point where no human alive could 
recreate their world in a single lifetime. However, not only is human culture beyond individual 
invention, it also does not require its beneficiaries to understand why something works. And in some 
cases, such as washing hands after using a toilet or performing a ritual, it is perhaps better that 
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individuals don’t understand the underlying mechanism [12: Chapter 7]! These innovations diffuse 
through transmission and selection mechanisms, but the question still remains—where do these 
innovations come from? 
As we discussed, a common perception of the source of innovation is Carlyle’s [68] “Great Man”—
the thinker, the genius, the great inventor—whose cognitive abilities so far exceed the rest of the 
population, they take us to new places through singular, Herculean mental effort. They may stand on 
the shoulders of the Greats of the past, but they see further because of their own individual insight; 
their own individual genius. In the next section, we argue that culture runs deep and that these 
individuals can be seen as products of collective brains; a nexus of previously isolated ideas. But 
first, we discuss a collective brain perspective on the main sources of innovation: serendipity, 
recombination, and incremental improvement. 
Revolutionary innovations often rely on luck rather than systematic and fully intentional 
investigation—i.e., serendipity provides individual with a glimpse under nature’s hood. Innovations 
don’t need intentional invention or anyone “racking their brains”; innovations can arise through 
mistakes in asocial learning or through imperfect cultural transmission (mistakes when copying) [39, 
69]. Although we know of no systematic effort to compare the role of serendipity in innovation, the 
number of major inventions and discoveries due to accidents is impressive. These include Teflon, 
Velcro, x-rays, penicillin, safety glass, microwave ovens, Post-It notes, vulcanized rubber, 
polyethylene, and artificial sweeteners [for more examples, see 70]. The classic serendipitous 
discovery was Alexander Fleming, who discovered penicillin after noticing that his colonies of 
staphylococci had been killed by a mold that had drifted in through an open window. Unlike his 
discovery, Fleming’s mode of discovery was neither remarkable, nor unusual. The basis for 
microwave ovens was discovered when Percy Spencer noticed that radar microwaves had melted a 
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chocolate bar in his pocket. The hard, vulcanized, rubber in tires was discovered when Charles 
Goodyear accidentally brought rubber into contact with a hot stove and noticed that instead of 
melting, it produced a more robust rubber. The list goes on, and without a systematic analysis, we 
are forced to speculate about the degree to which serendipity has driven innovation over time. In 
each of these cases, however, it is worth noting that the inventor also had a mind prepared to 
recognise the discovery embedded in chance observation. Goodyear capitalized on luck, but his 
prior exposure at the Roxbury India Rubber Company had made him aware of their rubber 
problems [71]. With the right cultural exposure, one person’s mistake is another’s serendipitous 
discovery.  
Cultural recombination, where different elements of culture are recombined in new ways, gives the 
appearance of inborn genius, but is the opposite—new ideas are born at the social nexus where 
previously isolated ideas meet. Theoretical models have shown the way in which recombination can 
generate innovations [e.g. 41, 72]. In the historical record, controversy surrounds the attribution of 
many of the greatest scientific discoveries, because they were discovered by multiple people at 
roughly the same time. Prominent examples include the theory of evolution by natural selection by 
both Darwin and Wallace, oxygen by Scheele, Priestley, and Lavoisier, and calculus by both Newton 
and Leibniz. Although theory predicts that recombination is crucial to innovation and we see 
recombination driving innovation in laboratory experiments [35], in the absence of systematic 
analyses of a random set of innovations, we are forced again to rely on case studies. The instances 
we mentioned represent a few instances of hundreds [73]. When we look across all of time, it may 
seem remarkable that these discoveries and inventions emerged so close in time, but this is 
consistent with innovation as recombination. Potential innovators, exposed to the same cultural elements 
arrive upon the same discoveries, in their own minds, independently; but from the perspective of the 
collective brain, these ideas are spreading and will eventually meet, unless they are forgotten first. 
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Both co-discoverers of the principle of natural selection had read Thomas Malthus’ essays and 
Robert Chambers’ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, and both had travelled extensively among 
diverse islands across archipelgos [74]. In most cases, we lack the appropriate data to track the 
shared cultural elements that led to each discovery.  
There are many examples where “new” inventions are more clearly the product of incremental 
improvements, recombinations of existing elements, and selection; the “inventor” is really just the 
popularizer [which also speaks to our need to identify the responsible Great Man; 68] 1. These 
“inventors” stand on a mountain of similar inventions. For example, although Edison and Swan are 
often credited with inventing the lightbulb, there were at least 22 inventors of incandescent 
lightbulbs prior to Ediswan’s modifications and commercial success [75]. Similarly, though 
Gutenberg made some improvements to the printing press, his real contribution was in popularizing 
techniques and technologies available at the time [76]. Other world-changing inventions, including 
the steam engine [77], automobile [78], telephone [79], and airplane [80], were gradual improvements 
and recombination of previous advancements, complete with accidental discoveries and controversy 
over who came first. Again, we have relied on examples, and more quantitative efforts are needed.  
Several other lines of evidence point to a crucial role of recombination, incremental improvement, 
and selection in innovation. One method that has proved useful has been the application of 
phylogenetic analyses to the constituent elements of a technology. These analyses, which have been 
applied to both portable radios [81] and bicycles [82], clearly reveal how the constituent components 
in a diversity of designs have recombined into the products we see today. Indirect support for the 
notion of innovation as the meeting of previously isolated ideas, practices, and understandings, 
comes from psychological data. For example, Maddux, Adam, and Galinsky [83] show that 
                                                 
1 The prevalence of the belief in a Great Man or wise ancestor is itself an interesting phenomenon. This recurring theme 
may be grounded in our success-biases, seeking out successful and prestigious models from whom to learn, even if those 
models exist only in the past. 
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individuals with multicultural experiences are better able to connect seemingly disconnected 
concepts or words (e.g., “manners”, “round”, and “tennis” are connected by the word “table”) and 
overcome functional fixedness (seeing an object’s potential uses as limited to it traditional or 
designed uses) [83]. And finally, experimental evidence from a cultural transmission experiment 
show that when given access to multiple models, individuals selectively learn from the most 
successful, but also recombine knowledge from the next most successful models, leading to better 
outcomes than those who did not have access to many models [35].  
At an individual-level, a collective brain perspective suggests that individual innovation benefits 
from exposure to a wide array of ideas, beliefs, values, mental models, and so on. This is part of 
what creates a “prepared mind”. Einstein, for example, was exposed to many ideas working at a 
patent office. Much of his work related to evaluating patents on electrical devices, including those 
related to the synchronization of time, which made later appearances in his thought experiments. 
Einstein cultivated a wide network, regularly traveling and forming friendships with the leading 
scientists of his day [84]. At the level of the collective brain, there are many factors that affect the 
overall rate of innovation and diffusion. The rate of innovation has not been identical across 
societies [85] and appears to have been increasing in recent times [86, 87], as one would expect if 
innovation is being driven by recombination. Understanding the collective brain allows us to identify 
the factors that affect the rate of innovation.  
INCREASING INNOVATION RATES 
Thus far we have outlined many of the processes that generate and transmit innovations within our 
collective brain. These can be distilled into an ontology that captures the factors that affect the rate 
of innovation. A useful starting point is an early model by Henrich [69] that attempted to explain the 
relationship between sociality and cultural complexity—why larger, more interconnected 
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populations have more complex culture, and by corollary, why increases in sociality are associated 
with increased innovation. The logic is captured in Figure 2. The approach assumes that when a 
cultural model is chosen, based on cues linked to success or skill, most learners won’t attain the level 
of skill (𝑧𝑖) possessed by the model on-average; transmission is error prone and the bulk of the 
distribution is below the skill level of the chosen model. The graph, as shown in Figure 2, implies a 
relationship between the number of models individuals have access to and the mean complexity of 
culture that the population can maintain. Without delving into the maths, consider what would 
happen if we increased or decreased the number of accessible models. Assuming individuals always 
select the most skilled model, with access to more models, there is a higher probability of at least 
one model having a skill level in the right tail and a learner being able to select a model with at least 
skill 𝑧𝑖. Over several generations, there is an equilibrium skill value that can be maintained for access 
to a particular number of models (i.e., the number of individuals needed to consistently be able to 
access a model with skill value 𝑧𝑖). Thus, the first factor that affects the rate of innovation is sociality. 
 
17 
 
Figure 2. Gumbel probability distribution of imperfect transmission, reproduced from Henrich (2004). 
Analyses by Kobayashi and Aoki [88] confirm that this logic is not specific to Henrich’s chosen distribution. 
For a given skill value 𝒛𝒊, the probability of acquiring a lower level skill (the portion of the distribution to the 
left of the dotted line) is less than the probability of acquiring an equal or greater skill level (the portion of the 
distribution to the right of the dotted line): learning is prone to error. As sociality and access to cultural models 
increases (e.g., through increased population size or density), there is a greater probability of at least one 
learner possessing skill level 𝒛𝒊 or greater and becoming the most skilled cultural model from whom the next 
generation learns. These assumptions and logic predict a relationship between sociality and equilibrium 
cultural complexity. 
The next factor we shall consider is the difference between the model skill and mean of learner 
skills, shown as 𝛼 in Figure 2. The 𝛼 parameter represents transmission fidelity. Higher transmission 
fidelity (lower 𝛼 ) increases mean cultural complexity. Finally, the 𝛽  parameter represents the 
variance of the distribution—the variety of cultural inferences and outcomes. We shall refer to this 
as transmission variance. Higher transmission variance (higher 𝛽 ) can also increase mean cultural 
complexity (as well as the number of errors). There are many factors that increase and decrease 
sociality, transmission fidelity, and transmission variance, and in turn increase and decrease the level 
of innovation. Let us now consider a few. 
There are several lines of evidence linking sociality to cultural complexity and innovation. For 
example, Kline and Boyd [33] show that both population size and island interconnectedness 
correlates with number of tools and tool complexity among Oceanic islands. Carlino, Chatterjee and 
Hunt [89] show that urban density (a proxy for interconnectivity) predicts the rate of innovation. 
Similarly, Bettencourt et al. [90] measure the relationship between the population of cities and 
number of new patents, number of inventors, and various measures of research and development. 
All scale exponentially, with a power law exponent greater than 1, suggesting accelerated gains as 
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population size increases—exactly what one would expect if recombination is primarily responsible 
for innovation. These results are consistent with other archeological, ethnographic, and 
ethnohistorical evidence [see 35].  
In the laboratory, three independent sets of experiments [35-37] tested the relationship between 
sociality and cultural complexity2. Together these experiments reveal that for sufficiently complex 
tasks, skill and know-how accumulate over generations when participants have access to more 
models and that while success-biased transmission is sufficient to drive the effect, where possible, 
participants also recombined information from multiple models. Muthukrishna, et al. [35] also tested 
the effect of loss of sociality by starting with a generation of experts. Confirming theoretical 
predictions, with access to fewer models, skill level reduced faster and reached a lower equilibrium.  
With increases in population size and increases in interconnectivity thanks to literacy, radio, 
television, and most recently, the Internet, we should now be experiencing an unprecedented rate of 
innovation and adoption. Indeed, this is what we see. Analyses of the diffusion of technologies in 
166 countries over the last 200 years suggest that adoption rates have been increasing [86]. Analyses 
of innovation within surgical techniques, as measured by patents and publications over the last 30 
years, shows an exponential increase in innovations [87]. More research is required to understand 
what these staggering increases in sociality imply for the rate of innovation. To better understand the 
source of these relationships, future research should integrate (or recombine) the burgeoning body 
of research on social networks with cultural evolution. It is within these networks that individuals 
select cultural models and through these links that innovations are transmitted. 
Transmission fidelity refers to the fidelity with which individuals can copy different ideas, beliefs, 
values, techniques, mental models, and practices. The factors that affect transmission fidelity relate 
                                                 
2 Consistent with other innovations, these key experimental results emerged close in time [35, 36 were published online 
on the same day]—another case of simultaneous invention! 
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to all aspects of the transmission process, including the model, the learner, and the content being 
learned. Examples of factors that increase transmission fidelity include: 
1. More social tolerance and prosociality—models that make themselves more accessible or are 
better teachers [47, 91, 92].  
2. Access to more models demonstrating variations in practices and skills [35].  
3. An extended juvenile period and/or longer lifespan, giving learners with more plastic brains 
more time to learn.  
4. Better learning abilities, such as a better ability to represent and predict the mental states of 
others (better Theory of Mind). 
5. Previously learned techniques and skills that make learning itself easier (e.g., mnemonics, 
study skills) or make new skills easier to acquire (e.g., discrete mathematics may make 
programming or game theory easier).  
6. Finally, the content itself can simplify over time, with easier to remember steps or 
manufacturing techniques, thereby increasing transmission fidelity [93, 94]. The evolution of 
better modes of transmission, such as spoken language; more recently, written language; and 
more recently still, broadcast technologies such as the printing press, television, and the 
Internet, have also been a boon to transmission fidelity.  
In Henrich’s [95] model, transmission variance refers to the variance in inferences when copying 
skills, but the logic applies to cultural variance more generally. Just as with genetic mutations, more 
variance usually results in more deleterious mistakes (there are more ways to break something than 
to make it work), but as long as there are selection biases in who to learn from, the few 
serendipitous mistakes payoff for the population. There are many factors that affect transmission 
variation. These include (1) cross-cultural psychological differences in acceptance of deviance, 
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tendency to deviate, and overconfidence and (2) institutional differences in policies that encourage 
and discourage deviation and risk taking. Research in the psychological sciences has identified 
cultural differences in “tightness” (strong social norms and low tolerance for deviant behavior) and 
“looseness” (weak social norms and high tolerance for deviant behavior) [96]. One measure of 
tightness and looseness is standard deviation in values and beliefs. Across 68 countries, a larger 
standard deviation is correlated with more innovation [67]. In contrast, more tightness is associated 
with more incremental rather than radical innovation [66]. A related cross-cultural difference is 
independence (or individualism) and interdependence (or collectivism), which may evolve for 
reasons that have little to do with innovation. Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Celik [97] focus on the quality 
or originality of innovations (e.g., number of citations per patent), rather than number of 
innovations. They find that individualism, lower uncertainty avoidance, and younger managers (all 
associated with higher variance), each lead to higher quality and more original innovations (also see 
[98]). 
Economists typically assume material incentives drive innovators and thus innovations. However, 
from our point of view, recombination and incremental improvements are critical to innovation and 
patents can also stifle these processes by inhibiting the flow of information across individual minds, 
instead incentivizing secrecy. Consistent with this, historical analyses of patent laws by Moser [99] 
and recent analyses of human gene patents by Williams [100] both suggest that patent laws may 
often be too strong, reducing innovation, but this does not mean no patents would lead to more 
innovation. Based on data on pharmaceutical patents in 92 countries from 1978 to 1992, Qian [101] 
argues that there may be an optimal level of protection, after which innovation is stifled. Increasing 
innovation is about empowering the collective brain.  
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On the other end, reducing the costs of failure by creating a safety net can influence innovation via 
multiple channels, including by allowing individuals to invest in broader social ties (expanding the 
collective brain) over kin ties and by increasing entrepreneurship directly. This relationship is 
supported by analyses of England’s Old Poor Law [102], more forgiving bankruptcy laws across 15 
countries [103], unemployment insurance in France [104], and in the United States, the introduction 
of food stamps [105], health insurance for children [106] and access to health insurance unbundled 
from employment [107], all of which increased entrepreneurship. Of course, there’s an optimal 
amount of social insurance vis-à-vis innovation, since increased funding of such programs can 
increase tax burdens—some data suggests that higher corporate taxes can lead to lower 
entrepreneurship [108, 109]. Overall, social safety nets energize innovation because they permit 
individuals to interconnect in broader, richer, networks.   
Although we have discussed sociality, transmission fidelity, and transmission variance separately, 
they are interrelated. For example, sociality may have little effect if a task is too simple and therefore, 
transmission fidelity is very high [36] or individual learning dominates solutions. Similarly, theoretical 
and experimental research with social network structures [110-113] suggests that too much 
interconnectivity can decrease variance. The trade-off is between interconnectivity increasing the 
probability of useful recombinations in the incredibly high dimensional space of cultural 
combinations and the reductions in variance caused by our selective biases applying to large portions 
of the population. These results and the collective brain perspective suggest an optimal amount of 
interconnectivity. However, since real societal networks are far less dense than laboratory networks 
and we are far from a completely connected network, human society will probably continue to 
benefit from increases in interconnectivity (i.e., we are still on the positive slope). Moreover, 
variance is introduced by other factors, such as mistakes in transmission and individual differences 
in social learning and conformist biases (e.g., higher IQ individuals may be less conformist [52]). 
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Finally, the same principles that lead to larger populations possessing more complex technologies 
[e.g., 33] can also shape and hone the mechanisms of cultural transmission, such as pedagogy and 
language.  
Various formal models have shown how cultural evolution may grow, hone, and optimize languages 
in a manner analogous to how cultural evolution shapes toolkits [12]. But unlike most tools, changes 
in languages can dramatically improve the efficiency of collective brains, just as myelination can 
make neural pathways more efficient over ontogeny. There are many ways that cultural evolution 
can optimize or make languages more useful. These include larger vocabularies [114, 115], bigger 
phonemic inventories, more grammatical tools [12], and more learnable syntactic morphologies 
[116]. Paralleling the relationship between population and toolkit size [33, 69], Bromham et al.’s 
[115] analysis of Polynesian languages reveals that as populations grow larger, they are more likely to 
gain new words and less likely to lose existing words. Indeed, the average American has a vocabulary 
approximately an order of magnitude larger than their counterpart in a small-scale society [114]. In 
the laboratory, just as manufacturing steps become more efficient in technological transmission 
experiments [93], artificial language transmission experiments reveal that over generations, these 
languages structurally change to become more learnable [117]. Paralleling this in the real world, 
Lupyan and Dale [116] show that languages with more speakers have an inflectional morphology 
more easily learned by adults, perhaps due to a greater number of adult second language speakers. 
However, increased learnability does not necessarily imply more efficient information transmission. 
Here, we push this line of thinking even farther to examine whether languages with larger speech 
communities have greater communicative efficiency.  
One way in which languages can more efficiently transmit information is by optimizing word length 
by information content. That is, by shrinking words with less information and thereby increasing the 
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correlation between word length and information content, the rate of information per unit time is 
more constant, resulting in “smoother” communication. Piantadosi, Tilly, and Gibson [118] measure 
this using Google’s datasets of the 25,000 most frequently used strings for each of 11 European 
languages, calculating the information content for every word. Intuitively, information can be 
thought of as predictability, in this case the degree to which the word can be predicted based on the 
preceding context [119]. For example, in the sentence “When it rains I bring my ____”, “umbrella” 
has far less information than “shotgun” since you could predict “umbrella” on the basis of the 
preceding words. Formally, Piantadosi et al. [118] estimate the average information content of a 
word 𝑊 = 𝑤 in context 𝐶 = 𝑐 using: 
−
1
𝑁
∑𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑃(𝑊 = 𝑤|𝐶 = 𝑐𝑖) 
where 𝑐𝑖  is the 𝑖 th occurrence of 𝑤  and 𝑁  is the frequency of 𝑤  in the corpus. The context is 
operationalized using the N-gram model, in this case the 3 preceding words before 𝑤. Word length 
is defined as number of letters, which is highly correlated with both phonetic length and the time it 
takes to say the word. Piantadosi et al. [118] show that word length is strongly negatively correlated 
with information content—words with less information tend to be shorter, but that languages vary 
in the strength of this correlation. Here, we use those correlations to test if cultural evolution is 
shaping language as it does other cultural elements: Do languages with larger speech communities 
reveal greater optimization, as measured by the correlation between word length and information 
content.  
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The correlation between the log of number of speakers3 (data from Ethnologue [120]) and the 
degree of optimization [118] is substantial: r = 0.83, p = 0.002, with a 95% confidence interval 
(bootstrapped) ranging from r = 0.57 to r = 0.95. Of course, these languages are related and 
therefore not statistically independent. To control for linguistic relatedness, we use the Indo-
European language tree [from 121] to calculate independent contrasts for the log of number of 
speakers and degree of optimization using the pic function in the R package ape [122]. We then fit a 
linear model using these contrasts (leaving out the intercept term). The correlation between 
contrasts is r = 0.77, p = 0.005, with a 95% confidence interval (bootstrapped) ranging from r = 0.50 
to r = 0.91. These preliminary results are consistent with a collective brain hypothesis, though we 
emphasize that much more extensive investigation is necessary (and these are currently underway).4  
                                                 
3 The analytic relationship in Henrich [69] specifies a logarithmic relationship, so we use the log of number of speakers. 
A linear fit would imply a problem with the model. All data and code is available on the Dryad repository. 
doi:10.5061/dryad.k82pd. 
4 One potential alternative explanation for this relationship is that optimization is somehow driven by number of adult 
second language speakers or some other feature of contact with other languages. However, unlike learnability [116], it’s 
not obvious how adult second language speakers could shorten words with less information. To the best of our 
knowledge, the number of second language speakers is only available for 4 of the 11 languages analyzed by Piantadosi et 
al. [118], so we are unable to eliminate this as a possible explanation. 
 
25 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between the number of contemporary speakers of a language and the degree to which 
word lengths have been optimized for communication. The horizontal axis is a log scale. The vertical axis is 
the correlation between the information content of words and their written length made positive for easier 
interpretation. 
In addition to language, cultural evolution may also be tuning the structures of the collective brain 
and the factors that affect sociality, transmission fidelity, and transmission variance. This tuning may 
offset a problem Mesoudi [123] discusses, whereby as cultural complexity increases, it is more 
difficult for each generation to acquire the growing and more complex body of adaptive knowledge. 
Consistent with this tuning, large-scale societies, with more complex technologies, engage in more 
teaching than small-scale societies [92, 124], thereby increasing transmission fidelity as cultural 
complexity increases. There is also some evidence for increases in division of labour (increased 
specialization), with more international trade and more domestic outsourcing of tasks (i.e., less 
vertical integration of all aspects of a business) [125, 126]. And despite these increases in pedagogy 
and specialization, our “extended juvenile period” has become further extended with delayed age of 
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first child [127] and longer formal education [128]. Finally, Americans continue to expand their 
vocabularies across their adult lives, which has expanded the difference in the verbal IQs between 
adolescents and their parents relative to prior generations, where vocabularies expanded little after 
the mid-twenties.  
In summary, sociality, transmission fidelity, and transmission variance all vary across populations 
and are subject to cultural evolution along a variety of dimensions. Over time, higher intergroup 
competition may favor institutions, such as social safety nets, that generate innovations. These 
factors affect the many ways in which innovations arise, such as exposure to more ideas (via cultural 
models prior to mass communication technologies), mistakes in transmission, and serendipity 
through fiddling around. If these processes are the primary mechanisms through which innovations 
arise, it would help explain the prevalence of Newton-Liebniz and Darwin-Wallace type 
controversies. Yet, in a population of millions, it was only Newton and Liebniz who discovered 
calculus, only Darwin and Wallace who developed the theory of evolution by natural selection; only 
a handful of people who actually invented each technology. Does the collective brain really relegate 
the specific innovator to a fungible node at a nexus in the social network? Do cognitive abilities, like 
IQ or executive function, really play no part?  
THE COLLECTIVE BRAIN FUELS THE CULTURAL BRAIN 
As we have discussed, innovations occur at the nexus where ideas meet. Thus, ceteris paribus, more 
innovations should occur in larger, more interconnected collective brains [33, 89, 90] and among 
individuals with access to more and diverse information [83]. But what about differences between 
cultural brains? Surely people differ in cognitive abilities and proclivities that affect their ability to 
innovate? Is the idea of innovation driven by big thinking geniuses truly untenable? In this section, 
we argue that collective brains make their constituent cultural brains more cognitively skilled in 
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surviving in the local environment and better able to solve novel problems, using a larger repertoire 
of accumulated abilities. Intelligence is often assumed to underlie both individual and population 
differences in creativity and innovation [129-132, 133; for further discussion, see SM]. While in 
principle intelligence may increase transmission fidelity, intelligence (as measured by IQ) is only 
weakly correlated with innovativeness (as measured by creativity), r = 0.20, and is at best a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for creativity [130]. Based on the arguments outlined in the previous 
section, we should expect that the collective brain can make cultural brains smarter through a 
combination of exposure to more ideas (sociality), better learning (transmission fidelity), and 
willingness to deviate (transmission variance). Of these 3 factors, exposure to more ideas is a 
necessary condition, since higher fidelity by itself would be associated only with incremental 
improvements and increased transmission variance by itself would be associated with more ideas, 
most of which would be bad. Consistent with this, multicultural individuals show more creativity 
[83], as do individuals with higher openness to new experience (but not the other Big 5 personality 
traits) [134]. Openness consistently predicted several measures of creativity, effect sizes ranging from 
𝛽 = 0.25 to 𝛽 = 0.66, except math-science creativity, which may require more domain knowledge. 
Nevertheless, to illustrate our point about specialized psychological abilities, we’ll address the 
common assumption that IQ leads to innovative ideas by showing how the collective brain can 
increase the IQ of cultural brains. 
In a recent review, Nisbett et al. [135] suggest that there are still many unknowns and much 
controversy surrounding IQ data, let alone its interpretation. Based on Nisbett et al. [135], but 
avoiding interpretations and explanations, here are a few stylized facts regarding IQ (by “IQ” we 
mean whatever it is that IQ tests measure).  
1. IQ is a good predictor of school and work performance, at least in WEIRD societies. 
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2. IQ differs in predictive power and is the least predictive of performance on tasks that 
demand low cognitive skill [jobs were classified based on "information processing", see 136]. 
3. IQ may be separable into crystallized and fluid intelligence. Crystalized intelligence refers to 
knowledge that is drawn on to solve problems and fluid intelligence refers to an ability to 
solve novel problems and to learn. 
4. IQ appears to be heritable, but heritability scores may be weaker for low socioeconomic 
status (SES), at least in the United States. 
5. Educational interventions can improve IQ, including fluid intelligence, which is affected by 
interventions, such as memory training. 
6. IQ test scores have been dramatically increasing over time (Flynn effect) and this is largest 
for nations that have recently modernized. Large gains have been measured on the 
supposedly “culture-free” Raven’s test, a test that measures fluid intelligence.  
7. IQ differences have neural correlates. 
8. Populations and ethnicities differ on IQ performance.  
An understanding of cultural and collective brains allows us to make sense of these otherwise 
puzzling findings. Before we address each point, here is the broader, currently controversial claim: 
For a species so dependent on accumulated knowledge, not only is the idea of a “culture-free” IQ 
test meaningless, but so too is the idea of “culture-free” IQ [137]. Our smarts are substantially 
culturally acquired in ways that alter both our brains and biology, and cannot meaningfully be 
measured or understood independent of culture. 
We argue that IQ is predictive of performance at school and work in WEIRD societies, because IQ 
measures the abilities that are useful at school and work in these societies. Culture runs deep and not 
only are obvious measures of cultural competence (e.g., verbal ability) a measure of culturally 
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acquired abilities, but so too are less obvious measures, such as Raven’s test. More thorough analyses 
are required to fully justify this perspective. Here we hope to inspire future work by laying out what 
this perspective implies for IQ alongside the evidence that does exist. The difference between 
crystalized and fluid intelligence is the difference between explicit knowledge and implicit styles of 
thinking, both of which vary across societies [138]. We will expand on this in the next section. For 
this reason, crystalized measures are more predictive of school performance than are fluid measures 
[139] and IQ is a weaker predictor of performance for jobs that do not require the skills measured 
by IQ tests. Moreover, we would predict that IQ tests would be less predictive of performance in 
locally valued domains in non-industrialized settings, such as many small-scale societies. 
IQ measures appear to be heritable, but among lower SES, heritability is lower—though this finding 
is inconsistent. The collective brain would predict that IQ is most consistent from generation to 
generation when children have a similar probability of acquiring as much adaptive knowledge as 
their parents. This is highly variable, but most stable among those with high SES. In contrast, there 
is more variability (and therefore more potential predictors) among those with low SES. If exposure 
to knowledge affects IQ, then this is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that deliberate attempts to 
transmit information (formal education) improve IQ, as do deliberate attempts to improve thinking 
itself (such as memory techniques). These effects can be large. 
Brinch and Galloway [140] measured the effect on IQ of a Norwegian education reform that 
increased compulsory schooling from 7 to 9 years. Their analyses of this natural experiment 
estimated an increase of 3.7 IQ points per additional year of education. Since this change only 
affected adolescent education, it is likely underestimating the overall effect of education on IQ. In 
another potential natural experiment, Davis [141] tested the IQ of the Tsimane, an indigenous 
forager-horticulturalist group in Bolivia. Some villages had formal schooling and others did not. 
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Children and adolescents with access to schooling showed a strong linear effect of age on IQ score 
(𝑅2 = 0.519), compared to no effect of age in those with no access to schooling (𝑅2 = .008). 
These results suggest that IQ increases with age not because of maturation, but because of the 
influences of a particular WEIRD cultural institution: formal schooling. This also suggests that 
through most of human history IQ did not increase with age. Moreover, it suggests a causal role of 
education in economic growth [see 142]. Although more evidence is needed to eliminate possible 
third variables, the evidence thus far is consistent with a collective brain hypothesis.  
By our account, IQ is a measure of access to a population’s stock of know-how, techniques, tools, 
tricks, and so on, that improve abilities, skills, and ways of thinking important to success in a 
WEIRD world. IQ tests are useful as a measure of cultural competence, which may require cultural 
learning (and there may be differences in this), but not as a universal test of “intelligence” as a 
generalized abstract problem solving ability. The Flynn effect [for recent meta-analyses, see 143, 144] 
describes the steady increase in mean IQ since IQ tests were developed, approximately 3 points per 
decade. If taken at face value, the Flynn effect renders large proportions of previous generations 
barely functional, but by this account, the Flynn effect becomes a measure of increased mean 
cultural complexity. This perspective is supported by data showing that IQ differences are strongly 
correlated with economic development [145]. Put another way, national IQ averages are exactly what 
one would expect if IQ were a measure of development; “one possible interpretation of the 
results… is that national IQ is just another indicator of development.” (p. 95) Understanding the 
collective brain gives us the tools we need to understand the variation we see in the Flynn effect. 
Just as with other measures of cultural complexity and language efficiency, these differences should 
track changes in population size, interconnectivity, transmission fidelity (e.g., formal education), as 
well as the introduction of specific styles of thinking (e.g., analytic vs holistic).  
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Populations differ in IQ, also a cause of much controversy, and these differences correlate with 
various measures of economic and social development [129]. Although some [129, 131-133] have 
argued for a causal relationship between IQ and development, the theory and evidence we have laid 
out so far suggest the opposite causal direction. Sociality (the size and interconnectedness of a 
population) leads to increased cultural complexity. Increased cultural complexity in turn smartens 
cultural brains by giving them access to a wider array of information, including physical, cognitive 
and linguistic tools, which may be recombined in new ways, generating new innovations.  
All of this is not to say that individual cognitive differences are unimportant to invention and 
innovation, only that these differences, like innovation, are an emergent property of the collective 
brain and that the focus on IQ, genius, and other individual differences, as the source of innovation 
have missed the broader collective brain processes that explain within-group and between-group 
differences. Within-populations, individual differences in genes, nutrition, and so on, may predict 
differences in cognitive ability, but these are difficult to disentangle from access to different models 
and access to different cultural elements. Overall, the collective brain hypothesis suggests that not 
only is it better to be social than have raw smarts, but smarts as they apply to success in your local 
environment, require you to be social. The broad structures of the collective brain affect the smarts of 
its constituent cultural brains. So too can the actual content being transmitted within the collective.  
 
CULTURE AFFECTS CULTURE: CONSTRAINING AND OPENING THOUGHT SPACES 
That aspects of culture ought to affect other aspects of culture is obvious and uncontroversial, at 
least at a population-level. For example, changes in the efficiency of language affect the rate at which 
information can be transmitted. Inventions such as the printing press, television, and the Internet 
and practices such as reading and formal education change the fidelity and reach of transmission. 
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More controversial arguments have been put forth about how some institutions can influence 
subsequent cultural evolution, such as monogamous marriage favoring lower fertility and greater 
gender equality [146]. What is less obvious is the ways in which cultural elements affect other 
cultural elements within individual brains. And less obvious still is how we might go about 
understanding these interactions. 
Acquiring some skills and knowledge can make other skills and knowledge more obvious, natural, or 
easier to acquire—living in a country that drives on the left or right side of the road can affect 
whether it feels more natural to walk on the left or right side when passing people (leading to chaos 
at airports!). The importance of this can be thrown into stark relief by looking at our closest cousins. 
Gruber et al. [147] ran a novel honey extraction task with honey stored in logs with holes drilled in 
the side. Chimpanzees from communities with dipping stick technology spontaneously 
manufactured sticks to extract the honey. Those from communities without any dipping stick 
technology were unsuccessful. In a follow up study, Gruber et al. [148] tried to make it easier, 
leaving an already manufactured stick in the vicinity and even leaving it already placed in the hole. 
Even so, those from communities without the dipping stick technology ignored or even discarded 
the stick notwithstanding it already being placed in the hole! 
Such studies of how exposure to previous ideas affect the creation of other ideas have not been 
performed with humans, at least not so deliberately, but in principle they are possible. These 
chimpanzee experiments also reveal that while exposure to previous ideas can open new thought 
spaces, they can also constrain thinking. If your collective brain only possesses hammers, everything 
looks like a hammer and all problems look like nails. But if the collective brain also has access to 
blades, hammers and blades may combine to open the space of axes with handles. We need not 
confine ourselves to hypotheticals. Educational psychology shows how learning some skills 
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improves the acquisition of others. Exposure to Socratic questioning improves critical thinking more 
generally [149]; learning the method of loci (attaching items to a physical location in memory) 
improves performance on memory tests [150], and exposure to the history of Darwin’s thought 
processes lead to a greater understanding of evolution [151]. These may seem obvious, but 
demonstrate how exposure to new techniques and ideas can affect the acquisition of other 
techniques and ideas. In other cases, the links between elements of culture are not so direct. Cross-
cultural differences in analytic vs holistic thinking [152] have been argued to have implications for 
various other values, beliefs, and behaviors from the evaluation of brands [153] to the construction 
of built environments [154]. 
Ideas have interacted, recombined, and shaped each other throughout history and in doing so, they 
have opened up new thought spaces and constrained others. The invention of the wheel, invented 
long after agriculture and dense populations, occurred only in Eurasia. Its invention allowed for the 
invention of wheelbarrows, pulleys, and mills—all absent outside Eurasia. Similarly, the discovery of 
elastic-stored energy allowed for the invention of bows, spring traps, and string instruments—all 
absent in Australia, where elastic-stored energy was not invented. Compressed air allowed for 
blowguns, flutes, and horns, and ultimately bellows, metallurgy, and hydraulics.  
The invention of these technologies also allows us to better understand the principles that underlie 
them—understanding the thermodynamics of a steam engine is a lot easier when you actually have a 
steam engine! [12] We use our technologies as metaphors, analogies, and concepts and they allow us 
to understand and innovate in ways we could not without such culture.  
The way in which ideas have shaped each other is a neglected aspect of cultural evolution, because it 
can be difficult to study. Here we offer some paths forward. Experiments can reveal the ways in 
which specific techniques and knowledge affect the acquisition of other techniques and knowledge, 
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and the field of educational psychology is a useful starting point. Cross-cultural comparisons can 
show how the presence or salience of some beliefs, values, and practices affect other beliefs, values, 
and practices. And the advent of large historical text corpora [e.g., Google N-grams; 155] and 
databases of history [e.g., 156] allows for systematic historical analyses of how the emergence of 
some ideas and technologies have allowed for the innovation of other ideas and technologies. 
Cultural phylogenetic analyses hold the potential to study how the evolution of one type of 
institution or practice influences the adoption of other institutions. Given the way in which ideas 
interact in the cultural brain and how the cultural brain accesses ideas in the collective brain, it 
should be clearer why culture and cognitive ability cannot be disentangled and why we might expect 
cross-cultural differences in cognitive abilities. Ultimately, further investigation of “culture-culture 
coevolution” may open the doors to a science of history. And in turn, as the mechanisms of the 
collective brain reveal, such investigation and recombination will lead to new innovations and new 
thought spaces. 
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